Between Meetings and Talks: Are Türkiye and Syria Moving Towards Reconciliation?

19-07-2024

Giulia Fabrizi

Middle East and Human Rights Researcher

Global Human Rights Defence

At the beginning of July 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced his intention to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a sign of reconciliation, either in Türkiye or in a third country (The New Arab, 2024). Questioned again on the matter on July 11^th, he added: “It is essential for Syria, whose infrastructure has been destroyed and its people have become scattered, to get back on its feet and to end the instability” (Soylu, 2024).

Syria has been torn for over a decade by a devastating civil war ignited in 2011 by anti-government protests. In the first years of chaos, Erdoğan had been very critical of Bashar al-Assad and even called him a terrorist for the violence committed against his own people (Reuters, 2017); therefore, Türkiye supported anti-regime rebel groups and demanded Assad’s ousting (Al-Mahmoud, 2024).

In 2016, though, parallel to Putin’s intervention in the civil war, Erdogan’s focus shifted towards the growing challenge in northeast Syria. There, Türkiye began to conduct offences along the border and to occupy cities like Afrin, al-Bab, and Azaz (Soylu, 2024) with the aim of impeding the fulfilment of the Kurdish political and military vision (Rudaw, 2024).

At this moment, Syria stands divided between Assad’s control, opposition groups, and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). In this context, Türkiye remains relevant on two grounds: the first is its view of the Kurdish administration at the border, considered a terrorist organisation and for that, repeatedly attacked (Al-Mahmoud, 2024); the second is its support of anti-Assad forces (broadly known as the SNA, Syrian National Army) that control two conspicuous strips of territory north of Aleppo (The New Arab, 2024).

Notwithstanding, in the frame of a potential reconciliation between the two countries, the presence of Turkish forces in Syria and its assistance to anti-government groups are important issues to address (Chevron, 2023). Indeed, Assad himself asked rhetorically to the press: “What is the basis for the meeting? Would it be ending the reasons for the problem, which are supporting terrorism and withdrawing from Syrian lands? […] This is the core of the problem.” (Middle East Monitor, 2024).

For Türkiye, though, the normalisation process is also an internal, political matter. In truth, the opposition has been pushing for it for years, hoping to expel most of the Syrians that have sought refuge in Türkiye in the past decade (Chevron, 2023). Paired with the recent acts of violence against Syrians in the country, refugee management seems to be a top priority for Erdoğan to handle, as Türkiye has been the most significant refugee-hosting country in the past decade, counting 3.47 million refugees by the end of 2023 – most of them Syrians (UNHCR, 2024).

As a matter of fact, the possibility of a reconciliation has attracted the attention of many international actors. For example, Iraqi Foreign Minister al-Sudani announced on Friday 12^th the possibility of hosting a first meeting between the two Presidents in the Iraqi Capital. Interested in mediating the process, it appears that Sudani’s government has been able to convince Assad to drop unachievable expectations and focus on an ‘eventual’ withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Syria (Soylu, 2024).

With the goal of enhancing regional stability and bettering its security and economic situation (also in view of next-year elections), Baghdad is eager to settle these talks (Rudaw, 2024), but Putin disagrees (Soylu, 2024). As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia wants the Syrian crisis to be over but hopes to achieve this by increasing, not reducing, its influence in the country – experts say (Soylu, 2024).

In conclusion, predictions are difficult to make, as complex and diverse are the rationales behind this rapprochement. Nonetheless, considering the long process of opening and reintegration of Assad’s Syria into the Arab League, negotiations have received overall positive support from the rest of the Arab world, especially from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Türkiye claims to be committed to fulfilling the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (Al-Mahmoud, 2024), adopted unanimously in 2015 by the UN Security Council to achieve a ceasefire and work towards a political transition process (Security Council, 2015) – this process might actually make Syria safer. Or, on the contrary, it could just be a ruse to increase Türkiye’s influence in the country in the hope of eliminating the Kurdish threat at the border.

Sources and Further Reading:

Al-Mahmoud, H. (2024, July 18). Al-Assad and Erdoğan show flexibility regarding a possible meeting.. Expected Arab role. Enab Baladi. Accessed on 21 July 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/07/al-assad-and-erdogan-show-flexibility-regarding-a-possible-meeting-expected-arab-role/

Chevron, F. (2023, January 18). I perché dell’apertura di Erdogan ad Assad. Geopolitica.info. Accessed on 21 July 2024. https://www.geopolitica.info/apertura-erdogan-assad/

MEMO, Middle East Monitor. (2024, July 15). Syria Assad says will only meet Turkiye’s Erdogan if ‘core’ issues addressed. Accessed on 22 July 2024. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240715-syria-assad-says-will-only-meet-turkiyes-erdogan-if-core-issues-addressed/

Reuters. (2017, December 27). Turkey’s Erdogan calls Syria’s Assad a terrorist, says impossible to continue with him. Accessed on 22 July 2024. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkeys-erdogan-calls-syrias-assad-a-terrorist-says-impossible-to-continue-wi-idUSKBN1EL0WV/

Rudaw. (2024, July 12). Baghdad to host Turkey-Syria meeting. Accessed on 21 July 2024. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/120720241

Security Council Report. (2015, December 18). Resolution 2254 (2015). Accessed on 21 July 2024. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf

Soylu, R. (2024, July 5). Erdogan plans to invite Syria’s Assad to Turkey. Middle East Eye. Accessed on 21 July 2024. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/erdogan-plans-invite-syrias-assad-turkey

Soylu, R. (2024, July 11). Putin opposes Iraq as venue for Erdogan-Assad meeting. Middle East Eye. Accessed on 21 July 2024. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/putin-opposes-iraq-venue-erdogan-assad-meeting

The New Arab. (2024, July 7). Erdogan says may invite Syria’s Assad to Turkey ‘at any moment. Accessed on 21 July 2024. https://www.newarab.com/news/erdogan-says-may-invite-syrias-assad-turkey-any-moment-0

UNHCR. (2024). Global Focus UNHCR Operations Worldwide; Türkiye; Strategy 2024, Situation Analysis. Accessed 5 July 2024. https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/t%C3%BCrkiye#:~:text=by%20year%2Dend%202023%2C%20there,of%20other%20countries%20of%20origin